Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.
[Note: This paper is specifically about teaching philosophy of education
courses, but it is also more generally about teaching introductory philosophy
courses.]
Cultivating Philosophical Skills and Virtues in Philosophy of Education
Presented at the Midwest
Philosophy of Education Society, Fall 1999
To educate educators! But the first ones must educate themselves!
And for these I write. --Nietzche(1)
In this paper I argue that the introductory course in philosophy of education ought to primarily focus on developing philosophical skills and virtues in the students (usually preservice teachers), above trying to improve their knowledge of intellectual history. Everyone's interests--preservice teachers' and their future students'--would be better served if we tried to teach our future teachers how to be philosophers, above teaching them about the history of philosophy. I will argue that this is a reasonable and attainable goal, and one that ought to be given greater consideration by teachers of philosophy of education courses.
I. The Historical Approach
For the most part, courses and textbooks in philosophy of education approach philosophy of education as either thematic or figurative history of philosophy of education, or moments in intellectual history that have influenced thought and practice in education. By "thematic" history I mean the "--isms" approach--idealism, pragmatism, realism, and so forth. By "figurative" history I mean reading some (or about) figures like Plato, Rousseau and Dewey, among others.
These historical approaches have been criticized often.(2)
Since the typical students in a philosophy of education course are in teacher-certification programs in colleges or departments of education, it is likely that they have never had a philosophy class before. It is also likely that they have never had an advanced course in the humanities or the social sciences that required reading often difficult primary sources (especially those of a more historical nature). This makes the figurative approach difficult, since they have such a difficult time reading the books, much less understanding and appreciating them. Since students have little background in intellectual history, they also tend to have trouble decoding much of the jargon and generalizations of the "--isms" approach. Also, students should realize that, charitably interpreted, there are few serious disagreements between the many "schools" of philosophy: a thoughtful person can and should accept many of the main tenets of each school. The "--isms" approach often discourages critical thinking and thoughtful and broad eclecticism in favor of a "jump on the existentialist (or idealist, or whatever) bandwagon" response.
The historical approaches, both "--ism-matic" and figurative, as typically presented in philosophy of education texts, also cloud the fact that philosophers throughout history have continually responded to problems. They have tried to understand and solve problems, and their writings are their proposed solutions. Since these courses and texts tend to focus neither on the figures' problems, especially as they understood their own problems, nor their reasoning and arguments behind their solutions, the focus is primarily on the proposed solutions. So students survey particular philosophers' or schools of philosophers' verdicts on various topics related to education, some which are similar to contemporary problems, probably more that are not. The historical approach to philosophy of education considers problems to some extent, but these are often problems that students don't find personally problematic. If there is any problem-solving in these courses, it is someone else's problems that are being solved, usually not the students' problems.
II. Who Cares?
My suspicion is that the overwhelming student reaction to all this history is, "So what?!?" Some students might find it somewhat interesting, and sometimes amusing, to hear the various proposals that people have believed throughout history, but nowadays most of the better proposals for education seems so obviously correct. Student reactions to these views might take the form of some of the following:
"Of course everyone should receive schooling of some kind! Of course discipline shouldn't be so strict! Of course how children actually do learn is relevant to how they should be taught! Of course poor people, females, and non-whites should receive schooling! Of course rote memorization is not a very good way to learn! Of course we should realize that children are not miniature adults! Of course students need some freedom, but they also need some constraint and guidance as well!"
These characterizations may be a bit unfair, but they are not very far off base. While some students do appreciate that many of the great historical philosophers' ideas about education were revolutionary at the time and have had important effects on our educational systems, most students find that most of the better ideas of the historical philosophers are just good common sense. History may have much to teach us, but what this is is often not obvious to most education students (oftentimes even with the students that will be history teachers). Students find much of the history of philosophy of education quite bizarre and almost all of it quite irrelevant to their teacher training. It is not hard to imagine, if we must, students asking questions like, "Who cares about these oddball views?", "How is this relevant to me?", "Why is this interesting?!", and finally, "But, how can this help me in practice?"
Most preservice teachers are pragmatists: they believe that something has "cash value," to use William James' phrase, only if it will help them cope and, eventually, flourish in their concrete experiences in the classroom. Students often and easily get the impression that philosophy of education offers little to help them prepare to be teachers and is thus of little value. It seems to me that there is often nothing wrong in being a pragmatist, being interested in something only if it will help one meet one's goals. I can agree, to a large extent, with the preservice teachers' estimations on what is important for them. But I disagree with their generalizations that philosophy of education is something that will not help them in ways that are important to their long-term success as teachers. It may be that one approach to philosophy of education, a primarily historical approach, is not very helpful for preservice teachers to meet their goals (whatever they may be, as they are often unarticulated--and a philosophy of education course is a good place to begin more clearly articulating these goals), but to condemn one species of philosophy of education is not to condemn the entire genus.
III. An Alternative, Non-Historical Approach
There is an alternative conception of philosophy of education that I suspect even the preservice teacher would be more likely to agree is a worthwhile pursuit, a conception of philosophy of education that involves the deliberate attempt to improve the preservice teacher's critical thinking, reading, and communication skills. While the preservice teacher usually has an overly narrow and myopic view of what her own goals are (and should be) and what would help her achieve her goals, usually she has also been given an overly narrow view of what philosophy of education is. Furthermore, this conception of philosophy of education deviates from much of mainstream contemporary philosophy. Because of this deviation, the study of philosophy of education tends to lacks the professional and vocational benefits, and, especially, the personal benefits, that the study and practice of contemporary philosophy provides.
In what follows, I develop the proposal that philosophy of education courses ought to focus on the fruits of learning how to do philosophy, on teaching preservice teachers how to be philosophers, above trying to acquaint them with intellectual history. In the process of developing these views, I dispense with the common but obviously mistaken views that philosophy and philosophers are inherently mystical, mysterious, inscrutable, irrelevant, and impractical. I develop the positive view that to be a philosophical person is simply and straightforwardly to be a person with particular intellectual skills and virtues. And there is nothing mysterious or strange about that. Furthermore, I suspect that many preservice teachers would agree that these kinds of skills would be good for her to have, that it would be good for her to try to become this kind of person. If this is so then it is likely that she would be more readily motivated to try to work to develop these skills, and, in effect, become a philosopher of education, not someone who has merely had a course on the topic.
IV. What is Philosophy of Education anyway?
Philosophers of education, as I understand their role, investigate the philosophical problems raised by education, just as, say, philosophers of art, science or religion investigate the philosophical problems raised by these respective fields, activities, or areas of experience.(3)
Usually the first question for any "philosopher of" a particular field is the question, "Just what is this field I am studying anyway?" What is art or science? How is genuine art or science to be distinguished from non-art or non- or pseudo-science? How is good science or art distinguished from bad science or art? Before we attempt to think clearly about these questions, we are often confident that their answers will come quickly and easily. But once we begin systematically thinking these questions through, we realize they are quite difficult to answer. Wittgenstein pointed out that it is very difficult to say exactly what a game is.(4)
If this is so difficult, we can expect that the philosophers' problems will be all the more challenging.
For the philosopher of education, an initial question is, "What is education anyway?" This seems to be an overly abstract question: perhaps some more accessible forms of the question are these: "What is an 'educated' person? What are the characteristics of an 'educated' person? Are there any qualities that anyone must have in order to be 'educated'? If so, which and how many of these characteristics are sufficient for a person to be 'educated'?' To call someone educated is to say something good about that person. What goods does an 'educated' person possess?"
As with our questions about games, art, and science, we ought not be too disappointed when we find that our response to the question of what an educated person is not a perfectly sound proof, immune from all counterexamples or exceptions. But this need not distract us from our goal, for even if we are unable to discern exactly what an educated person is and is not, if we are persistent and careful we can expect that we will gain a greater understanding of what it is to be educated, what the marks of an educated person are (and, by extension, what an uneducated person is too), and what must be done to bring a person from the latter camp into the former. By carefully considering these kinds of difficult questions, preservice teachers should begin to more carefully develop and articulate their sense of directions and goals for success in teaching.
Thus a primary question for philosophers of education is the question, "What is an educated person?" Since education is such a broad, all-encompassing phenomenon, we can expect that philosophers of education will have to consider a wide range of philosophical problems raised by education. What are some of the philosophical problems confronting would-be teachers, especially problems that they might find interesting? I suspect that for preservice teachers some of the more interesting problems are those that directly involve their own beliefs, characters, actions, and feelings. For anyone, the most pressing problems, the ones that we are often most motivated to try to understand, are usually those that concern and affect his or her self.
V. What is an educated person?
If we consider the general question "What are the marks of an educated person?", some of the more immediate responses might likely include that an educated person, minimally, is able to communicate well--understand others and express herself clearly, is able to reason well, and has knowledge of important facts and how to perform important cognitive tasks.(5)
Beyond this, many would say that an educated person, in a broad sense, is a morally good person, a person who tries to do right and avoid doing wrong, cares about the right sorts of things and has a good set of priorities, and does his or her part to contribute to a just society. Many would also say that an educated person is self-reflective: she thinks about her own beliefs, goals, and virtues and vices, and tries to improve herself where she can; she considers the meaningfulness of her life, whether her life is good and why this is so. If her life is not as meaningful as she hopes it should be, she tries to make it more meaningful.
The items on this short list above might seem rather obvious. It is not very controversial to argue that since educated people have many of these qualities, if teachers are in the business of producing educated people, they should encourage and cultivate these kinds of qualities in their students. Also, teachers should develop and improve these qualities in their own persons, both for their own growth as educated persons and so students might follow their positive examples.
VI. Meaning, reason, and truth
But perhaps this characterization of an educated person is not so obvious. Many would agree that knowledge, abilities to clearly communicate, and moral decency are necessary for a person to be properly educated. But most of us are rather unclear about what we actually mean by any of this. If asked, "What is knowledge?" or "What is a good person anyway?" we may have some answers on hand, but more often many of us are confused and at a loss for explaining what we actually think about such matters. We often say things without considering what we might mean by them. But, presumably, having some idea what we mean when we say things like these is very important.
I propose that one thing philosophy of education courses should do is address these kinds of confusions and attempt to equip preservice teachers with the skills to begin clearing up some of their latent philosophical confusions and better discern what they should believe about philosophical matters relevant to their own beliefs, characters, and actions, both in and out of the classroom. Thus philosophy of education courses ought to focus on developing philosophical skills and abilities and integrating these skills into preservice teachers characters so that they might become virtues--traits of character, manifested in habitual action and thinking, that are good for people to have.(6)
We ought to deliberately teach preservice teachers how to think philosophically and, at a deeper level, become the kind of people for whom philosophical questioning and thinking becomes a habit.(7)
Once the notion of philosophical skills and virtues is understood, it seems likely that preservice teachers would agree that these traits would be good for them to have, both professionally and personally. Thus, the motivational and interest factors are already there, in contrast to the motivation and intellectual background required to make the most of the more historical approach.
VII. Philosophy of education as 'applied' philosophy
To investigate the above brief characterization of an educated person we must investigate topics in the traditional areas of philosophy. If we think an educated person has knowledge, it would be good for us to have some better ideas of what knowledge is. We should then do some epistemology or theory of knowledge. If we want to know what good reasoning is, we should learn something about logic. Similarly, if we want to have a better idea what a good person is and some proposals for what the right thing to do is, we should learn some about ethics and moral philosophy. Are the school systems unjust? To answer this we should learn some ideas of what a just society would look like. The same argument would apply to concerns that insights from philosophy of language, philosophy of science, aesthetics, and existentialism, and other philosophical sub-disciplines are relevant. While these disciplines' practitioners usually deal with their subjects in quite technical manners, I see no reason why many of the core themes and theories from these fields cannot be presented in a manner that the average undergraduate can understand and appreciate them. It seems to me that many of the more sophisticated philosophical theories have their causal or conceptual roots in ways that "ordinary" people think about things. Or, at least, they can be interpreted and presented this way.
We all have ideas about knowledge, justice, and goodness, but most of our ideas are unclear and confused since we have neither the patience, interest, nor trained ability to clear up for ourselves what we believe. Recognizing this common confusion, incoherence, and likely inconsistency in our own beliefs and attitudes seems to be a first step in becoming a philosophical person and a clear communicator.(8)
People sometimes find philosophers annoying because, for one reason, they tend to continually probe people with questions: they say, "I don't understand what you mean by that, could you please explain again, perhaps in other terms? I'm unclear what you are saying, can you help me understand?"
These questions show that philosophers tend to hold other persons' words, and their own, in high regard. They take what people say very seriously and don't want to misunderstand or misrepresent their ideas. But these philosophical skills are just careful listening skills, which, unfortunately, are not encouraged or deliberately taught as much as they should be. These also transfer to skills in oral and written communication, abilities to speak and write clearly, simply, and vividly.(9)
Careful communication lends itself to critical discussion and dialogue, as opposed to people just speaking their mind without serious concern that people understand them. Clarifying the ways we speak and write also allows for more people to engage in the conversation: confusing talk is frustrating and alienating for everyone, especially those who are unfamiliar with the jargon. That much of philosophy (and the humanities in general) is unnecessarily unclear in its manner of presentation probably contributes to the ambivalence many people have about these subjects.(10)
This unfortunate situation should be remedied.
VIII. Clearing away some confusions
I have argued that a first step in a philosophy of education course is to show students that there is much confusion and a lack of clarity in the ways we all talk, show them that this is a problem, and begin showing them how to develop the skills to carefully and critically ask themselves and others what they mean when they say things. I suspect that many students are surprised when they come to see how inadequate (even by their own lights) their understanding is of many of concepts which they regularly use. Difficult concepts such as knowledge, skill, good thinking, right and wrong, good and bad, truth, error, correct answers, happiness, skills, fairness, teaching, learning, respect, justice, equality, deservings, meaning, value, grading, rights, and many other concepts are all immediately relevant to the daily practices of a teacher, in and out of the classroom. But what do these all mean? We use them all the time, but most of us just haven't thought about what they mean or what these concepts stand for. It seems to me that it would be good to focus student attention on what they think they are saying when they communicate. This could easily take the form of interesting brainstorm sessions. In suggesting that we should focus on trying to understand what we mean when we use words, I do not mean to suggest that this activity must be done to the point where it becomes excessive and tedious. My proposal is similar to the dusty and dry 'analytic' philosophy of education tradition in that it focuses on 'clearing away confusion', analyzing concepts, and discerning criteria, but mine makes room for normative and "fuzzy" questions and is more modest in its estimations for success. Most contemporary analytic philosophy does not suffer from the positivistic vices of early analytic philosophy of education.
Students should also be acquainted not just with influential views about the meanings of concepts, for example, proposed meanings of "right" and "wrong," but, beyond these concerns about meanings, there are the more important proposals for what it is for something to be, for example, right or wrong, or genuine knowledge, as opposed to mere true belief. Students should investigate the most influential conclusions held on these topics and the reasons and arguments behind these conclusions. The ability to think in terms of conclusions, proposals, or "main points" and to articulate the reasons and premises that are said to validly support them is an extremely valuable skill. To discern someone's main point sometimes requires great attentiveness, patience, and charity. To articulate the reasons behind the conclusion is to make the issue clearly understandable. Even just a little logic, if understood well, can go a long way. Also, the disposition to ask and determine how questions or problems could be answered or solved is a valuable one.(11)
Are we worried about an empirical problem that would be solved by a scientist? A conceptual problem, a problem or disagreement about how we use words? Or some other kind of problem? The ability to identify the kind of problems or issues we are dealing with is invaluable to understanding and solving them.
Navigating through these philosophical problems making use of these intellectual skills we can discuss questions such as, "What is knowledge?" One traditional account of knowledge is that it is something like justified true belief. Many preservice teachers are confident that one can know a false belief, or that one person can know that something is true and someone else can know it is false. Other students are confident that to know something is just to believe it. Others at least say things that suggest that they are skeptical about the whole notion of truth and falsity ('that may be true for you but not true for me!') or the idea that having reasons is necessary for some kinds of beliefs to be knowledge. Others might dispute the idea that some knowledge arises from a properly functioning cognitive system, such as, for example, good vision. They may find that to be prejudicial against the blind or nearsighted.
Since teachers are in the business of ensuring that students gain knowledge (and to properly grade students, teachers must themselves know whether the student knows the matter), these issues should be discussed and some of the more obvious worries and confusions laid to rest. Some of these worries above are legitimate (not wanting to offend others by saying their beliefs are false, not wanting to say that people of other time-periods or cultures are cognitively inferior, compared to us), but if we understand the worries, it is fairly clear that traditional accounts of knowledge, truth, and reason-giving can accommodate them. Thus there is little reason to believe that there is no knowledge or true beliefs or that any opinion is as good as any other.(12)
It seems reasonable to believe that a teacher's positive understanding of knowledge, truth, and reason-giving would be helpful for her in her task of transmitting knowledge, enabling her students to believe truths, and fostering her students in giving reasons for their beliefs.
Views similar to the relativism and skepticism about knowledge above are, if not actually held, more commonly expressed with respect to ethics and morals. For example, there is the common view that "What's right for you (or 'them') might be wrong for me (or 'us')!" Views like these are relativistic ones. In their common forms, they have been repeatedly shown to be inadequate, if not outright incoherent.(13)
Yet they do seem to be somewhat popular. Even though almost all preservice teachers believe the numerous recent acts of violence and terrorism by young people are all morally wrong (that is, that those kids really ought not have done those actions), many of these same students are apt to proclaim allegiance to the "whatever you believe is right is right for you" theory. I suspect that most of them really do not accept this theory, but it seems that great progress would be made if their relativistic worries were laid to rest, as well as the common view that moral education must be religious-based. The progress in rejecting these views would not necessarily be moral progress (as rejecting relativism and divine command theories of ethics does not entail becoming a more moral person), but it is certainly an improvement in one's thinking skills to learn to understand what follows from a general principle and reject the principle on that basis.
Much of the more fruitful discussions about moral education seem, to me, to involve clearing away objections to directive moral education,(14)
the strategy of directly and explicitly teaching that some kinds of actions are usually right, that others are usually wrong, that these are the marks of a morally virtuous or good person, that these characteristics make for a bad person, that these are the kinds of things that you should more care about in life, and so forth. While the question of what should be taught is somewhat, although not very, controversial (we all agree about much more that we realize), there seem to be no good arguments against purposefully teaching ethics and morals. Since teachers do it anyway, whether they want to or not, a course in philosophy of education is an ideal place to show them that there is nothing inherently objectionable in the practice. This frees teachers to do what they would have done probably naturally but without any lingering, deep-seated worries that they are manipulating or brainwashing their students, violating their autonomy, or overstepping their bounds.
Teachers can easily understand ethical theories and theories of justice such as consequentialism, Kant and Kantianisms (such as Rawls' and Alan Gewirth's theories), virtue theory, communitarianism, and even Nozick's libertarianism. Versions of each of these theories can be developed from basic moral insights that preservice teachers already have or would readily acknowledge as, at least, plausible if they were shown to them. We all have intuitions that support each of these moral points of view, simple intuitions that are can be show to be the roots of some very sophisticated moral theories. Strictly speaking, many of these theories are incompatible at the fringes, but this doesn't seem relevant here, since we are interested merely in providing preservice teachers better frameworks to think about right and wrong and good and bad in their own personal lives and as teachers, as well as have some better principles with which to teach their students.
Another topic related to ethics is multiculturalism. While this is often discussed in other courses, it seems that it is, at root, a movement grounded in moral perspectives. Making these perspectives explicit should demystify some of the political jargon surrounding multiculturalism and enable teachers to better understand the issues. On a related note, the common educational plea for "tolerance" should be explored and clarified. What should we be tolerant of? Are there things we shouldn't tolerate? Why? Developing a more careful, reflective principle of tolerance should be a goal for a teacher who values diversity and individuals' well-being.
A few more final proposals: it would behoove science teachers, as well as their students, if they were acquainted with some basic issues is philosophy of science. If possible, it would be wonderful for math teachers to have a good answer to why it is true that 2 and 2 are 4. It would be good for teachers to consider whether the school system is just or unjust, and what might be demanded of us and the policy makers if they are unjust. Since most teachers will work in the public schools, it might be worthwhile to wonder why we have public school systems in the first place. There are historical reasons, of course, why this is so (schools are very important for a nation's well-being), but food and clothing are also very important, and we don't have a public restaurant or clothing store system to provide these goods to the masses. Presumably, treating education as a public good has consequences. It would be interesting to discern what they are.(15)
Finally, since teachers' long term goals include somehow making a contribution to the meaningfulness of their students' lives (even if it is never consciously realized, or not realized until many years later) it seems appropriate to consider the question of what is a meaningful or good life. While Sartre may be too difficult to read, many other philosophers and fiction writers have had other interesting ideas that ought to be considered and discussed.(16)
This reflection should turn back on the teachers' lives, as their abilities
to reflect philosophically about their lives and their own educational goals
(for both themselves and their students) should keep them growing throughout
their teaching careers. This sort of philosophical disposition might well keep
them intellectually alive and thereby help to avoid burnout.(17)
IV. Conclusion
To conclude, a careful and self-reflective, but, at times, exploratory and playful, investigation of these kinds of philosophical questions encourages the development of philosophical skills and virtues. If preservice teachers possessed more of these skills and virtues, this would be good for both them and their students. This alternative approach to philosophy of education focuses on improving teachers' cognitive abilities in areas that are not often addressed in non-philosophical courses. It attempts to enhance teachers' intellectual curiosity, open-mindedness, self-reflection, creativity, attentiveness, insight, communicativeness and abilities to articulate, patience, and understanding, among many other virtues.(18)
I have argued that these skills and virtues are more readily developed
through the study and practice of contemporary philosophy, rather that the
study of the history of philosophy.(19)
Facts about intellectual history are easily and quickly forgotten; it seems likely that a semester spent deliberately working to develop philosophical virtues could have a greater, perhaps life-long, impact on a teacher and his or her future students. For this reason, I encourage further investigation towards focusing philosophy of education on the practice of teachers doing philosophy and becoming philosophers.(20)
1 Richard Schacht attributes this quote to Nietzche, but says that the manuscript source is uncertain. He says it is cited elsewhere as "VII: 215." See his "A Nietzchean Education: Zarathustra/ Zarathustra as Educator," pp. 318-332, in Philosophers on Education: New Historical Perspectives, ed. Amelie Rorty (Routledge, 1998).
2 For criticisms of the historical approach to philosophy of education, some of which are similar to the ones offered here and below, see David P. Ericson's "Orientation to Philosophy of Education: Locating the Field of Play for New Audiences," Educational Theory, Fall 1997, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 501-511. Also, for criticisms of the "--isms" approach in philosophy of education see William F. Frankena's "Is the Philosophy of Education Intellectually Respectable?" in the Proceedings of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the Philosophy of Education Society, ed. Robert E. Mason, 1961, pp. 36-45. Interestingly, while criticisms of the historical approaches are easy to come by, I have not found anything like a substantive defense of the approach beyond unsubstantiated claims that the approach has its merits. For an overview of the debates over the value of studying the history of philosophy in general, see Jorge J.E. Gracia's Philosophy and Its History: Issues in Philosophical Historiography (SUNY, 1992). Also see Michael Scriven's "Increasing Philosophy Enrollments and Apointments through Better Philosophy Teaching," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Assocation 50, no. 3 (1977), pp. 232-234, and continued in 50, no. 4 (1977): 328. Among many other interesting and provocative suggestions, Scriven suggests that "philosophy of education should come home to mama" (324).
3 This characterization of philosophy of education is parallel to Susan Haack's understanding of philosophy of logic. See her Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge UP, 1978), p. 1.
4 See Ludwig Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations 3rd Edition, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1958).
5 I obviously sidestep the more difficult question of which knowledge and skills are important.
6 This definition of a virtue is found in James Rachel's The Elements of Moral Philosophy 3rd Ed., (McGraw-Hill, 1999), p. 178.
7 I do not offer much in terms of practical suggestions on how to do this. For suggestions, see Richard Feldman's Reason and Argument 2nd Edition (Prentice Hall, 1999), Anthony Weston's A Rulebook for Arguments (Hackett, 1992), Martinich's Philosophical Writing 2nd Edition (Blackwell, 1996), Tziporah Kasachkoff, ed. In the Socratic Tradition: Essays on Teaching Philosophy (Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), and the journals Teaching Philosophy and Metaphilosophy.
8 A.P. Martinich, in his Philosophical Writing 2nd Edition (Blackwell, 1996) argues that many of the skills of philosophy are just good communication skills. He writes that, "If half of good philosophy is good grammar, then the other half is good thinking," p. 4.
9 William Tolhurst brought the "clear, simple, vivid" mantra for writing to my attention.
10 See Gerald Graff's Beyond the Culture Wars: How Teaching the Conflicts Can Revitalize American Education (Norton, 1992) for considerations along these lines.
11 I raise this point because I have had a student suggest that a philosophy of education course should discuss the merits of block scheduling, tracking, and cooperative learning. Whether these methods are worthwhile is an empirical/social-scientific question, not a philosophical question. These are philosophical questions only insofar as they involve asking whether whatever is promoted by these methods is valuable or good, but I suspect the student was not interested in this. Rather she was interested in learning if these methods work or not.
12 For a good introduction the issue of relativism in both epistemology and ethics, see Relativism: Cognitive and Moral, eds. Jack Meiland and Michael Krauz (U. Notre Dame Press, 1982).
13 See any recently published introduction to ethics textbook. There are very sophisticated versions of ethical relativism, but none of these versions readily imply the "If I like it, it's right for me" attitude or crude ethical theory.
14 For some of these objections to and defenses of directive moral education, see the articles on moral education in Christina and Fred Sommers, eds., Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life: Introductory Readings in Ethics 4th Edition (Harcourt Brace and Co., 1997) pp. 574-704.
15 Richard Feldman suggested this topic of concern.
16 See, for example, Peter Singer's How Are We to Live? : Ethics in an Age of Self-Interest (Prometheus Books, 1995).
17 William Tolhurst suggested this point.
18 Good discussions of these virtues are found in W. Jay Wood's Epistemology: Becoming Intellectually Virtuous (Inter-Varsity Press, 1999) and Linda Zagzebski's Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge (Cambridge UP, 1996).
19 Arguments for this claim concerning the lack of parity between the fruits of doing philosophy (including learning about some contemporary philosophers' conclusions) versus learning about philosophy and learning historical figures' conclusions needs to be made more explicit. I am thankful to Harold Brown for pointing this out to me. A further problem is that the relationship between learning facts and skills need to be investigated.
20 For helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions for this paper I am grateful to Professors Harold I. Brown, Randall Curren, Richard Feldman, and William Tolhurst, and students in my 'Introduction to Philosophy of Education' course at NIU, especially Shawn Sims.