Nathan Nobis, Ph.D.

nathannobis.com

aphilosopher@gmail.com

Animal Dissection and Evidence-Based

Life-Science & Health-Professions Education:

A Response to Jonathan Balcombe’s Commentators

(Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science, 5(2), 2002, pp. 157-161)

[PDF (photocopy) version of article]

Cambridge mathematician and philosopher W.K. Clifford concluded his famous essay “The Ethics of Belief” with the bold claim that “it is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone to believe anything upon insufficient evidence” (1879). Clifford’s enthusiasm for “evidentialism”—the principle that one should proportion one’s belief to the strength of the evidence—may have been overzealous, but a plausible interpretation of his view is this: since beliefs often have serious moral consequences, one should base one’s beliefs on the evidence, and it is intellectually and morally irresponsible not to do so. This perspective motivates recent so-called “evidence-based” medicine and educational methods.

Jonathan Balcombe’s case for replacing learning methods that require pain, suffering and death for animals with methods that do not (e.g., computer-assisted learning, 3-D models, videotapes, and other alternatives) can be seen as motivated by this evidentialist perspective (2000, 2001). Balcombe provides a wealth of empirical evidence from educational studies to show that, in most contexts, animal dissection is not necessary, and is even counterproductive, to achieve valid educational goals, especially higher-order goals (e.g., concept learning and problem solving). He shows that no sound defense of dissection has been given.

In her response, Lara Rasmussen summarizes Balcombe’s case:

Can we learn as effectively without hurting or killing another being? If so, why do we not try? Many of the studies Balcombe cites have supported sufficiently the adequacy and, often, superiority of learning methods that do not harm animals or students. . . The first of the aforementioned questions is being answered; we can learn effectively with these non-detrimental methods. Those who seek to educate [and accept the principle of ‘do no harm’] must seize the second question because they see, in the big picture, the benefit for themselves, their students, their society, and other sentient beings (2001, p. 132).

Other commentators often fail to address Balcombe’s pedagogical, scientific and moral arguments and engage the evidence he presents. Their support of dissection is thereby not evidence-based. Their unjustified belief in the importance of dissection, widely held by science and health-professions instructors, has moral consequences for students, society, and, especially, the animals who suffer and die because of it. I will summarize their criticisms and respond.

Randy Moore, and, to a lesser extent, Kathleen Marr focus on alleged benefits for humans that come from animal dissection in medical research. Moore claims that dissection “has produced knowledge that has improved our lives . . , reduced needless pain and suffering, . . has been important for developing vaccines, cancer treatments, and surgical procedures . . and [has] been critical to . . prolonging [human] life” (pp. 136-137). Marr suggests that “whole animal models” are needed for testing drugs for humans and falsely states that, historically, human anatomy and physiology could not have been understood without animal dissection (p. 139).

Two replies: first, these claims are irrelevant to the issue of whether dissection is necessary for educational purposes. Second, they assume that animal models are reliable and effective for understanding and curing human diseases. This assumption has been seriously criticized in light of the history of medicine, comparative physiology, and evolutionary theory (Greek & Greek, 2000, 2002; LaFollette & Shanks, 1993a, 1993b, 1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996; Goodall, 2000; Barnard & Kaufmann, 1997). If the critics’ arguments are sound (and no one has shown that they are not), then, contrary to Marr’s claims, it is false that students who wish to improve human health by “becom[ing] involved in pharmacology, anatomy, and the medical aspects of biology need a basic framework that uses animal models as the underpinning” (p. 140).

While Moore thinks education would be “hindered” by banning earthworm dissection and seems to suspect that “enhancing science education depends on dissecting rats,” he gives no evidence for these claims (p. 137). Valli and Marr argue, however, that alternatives to dissection are appropriate for pre-college and non-majors biology courses. For these students, Valli finds that “alternative methods of learning animal anatomy appear to be adequate” (p. 127). Marr emphasizes that dissection “has absolutely no place in the precollege classroom,” and that is it not even necessary for biology majors whose interests are in other areas of biology (p. 140). Here Balcombe and his critics agree. Advocates of humane education surely would find progress were Valli’s and Marr’s views widely accepted among biology teachers.

Disagreements, however, concern dissection and health-professions students. Concerning medical students, Valli claims, “what is critical is that the professional colleges, to produce competent graduates, provide sufficient hands-on animal experience with both live and dead animals” (p. 127). He asserts that, “the sensitivity gained to the feel and smell of fresh or fixed animal tissue is in itself a core component of a medical education” (p. 128). He claims, “For students who plan to practice medicine, the more exposure they have to the sight, smell, and texture of tissues, the better their preparation to become confident clinicians” (p. 129).

Again, these claims are only assertions: no evidence is given. Furthermore, the research that Balcombe reviews shows that Valli’s claims are false. This is to be expected, as it is prima facie implausible that a physican would be less competent or “confident” had he or she not dissected animals. Animal dissection is not necessary to enter medical school or to practice or teach medicine: if it were educationally essential, it would be required (Bekoff 2002).

Valli correctly notes that physicians need to learn hand-eye coordination, the texture of tissues, and instrumental techniques, and that veterinarians need to learn safe animal handling and restraint, intubation, anesthesia and monitoring, the effects and control of bleeding, and the sight, smell, and feel of live tissues (pp. 129-130). However, clearly there are ways to learn these skills in both medical and veterinary contexts that don’t harm any animals. Experience working in a clinic, assisting professionals, works very well, as Valli notes. It is likely that “on the job” education and training is more effective anyway. Thus, no reason is given to believe that animal dissection is needed for students, at least in the human health professions.

Veterinary students clearly need to be familiar with their patients’ anatomy. Some dissection is thereby necessary. Balcombe clearly recognizes this in his support of client-donated and ethically sourced animal cadaver programs at www.educationalmemorial.org. Balcombe shows, however, that there are many viable alternatives to terminal surgery labs, that students who use alternatives are just as competent and confident, and that this “provide[s] a strong case for the replacement of traditional labs in which healthy animals are killed” (2001, p. 124). It is not clear why Balcombe’s critics disagree.

Concerning terminal research designed to benefit animals themselves, we do not allow unconsenting humans to be experimented on and killed for the sake of other humans. Concerning research to enhance “our knowledge of life,” satisfy personal curiosity, or spark scientific inspiration (Moore, 2001), ethical constraints prohibit this for humans. It is doubtful that strong arguments could be found to morally justify these protections for humans but not animals.

In sum, Balcombe has shown that alternatives to dissection are educationally sound. No successful objections were given to his arguments. Most animals that will be dissected suffer greatly in their procurement and, obviously, all die (PETA, 1990). This raises serious and broad moral questions concerning society’s treatment of animals. The views of defenders and even critics of animal rights imply that the status quo concerning dissection is, at least, highly morally objectionable (Cohen & Regan, 2001; Nobis, 2002; Sapontzis, 1995; Engel, 2001). There are no moral, religious or legal objections to the use of alternatives (Francione & Charleton, 1992). Dissection is costly; alternatives are cheaper. The evidence is clear: from both educational and moral perspectives, with exceptions only for some select aspects of veterinary curriculum, animal dissection is indefensible. To deny this is to deny the evidence, which violates both reason and morality.

REFERENCES

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